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Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – 
immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where 
there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so 
they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country-folk. Migrant groups 
compete against one another by helping their country-folk and to win grants from the 
foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources 
invested by the groups’ supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two 
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INTRODUCTION 
Immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional offering many perspectives, some 
of which may come into conflict with others, leading to the development of rivalrous strategies, 
at least partly overlapping loyalties of supporters, and the necessity of laying claim to having the 
bigger impact.  Supporters of each perspective invest resources and effort into convincing the 
general  body  of  immigrants  of  the  virtue  of  their  point  of  view.  These  rivalries  can  be 
characterized as contests — each side struggles, investing substantial effort, pushing their own 
agenda in helping their immigrant society.  
  In our society there exists a foundation that has resources and wishes to help migrants. To 
help  migrants  the  foundation  works  indirectly,  offering  grants  to  groups  who  directly  invest 
efforts to help migrants (for example in the USA we have the MacArthur Foundation and  the 
Ford Foundation that want to help immigrants.)  The foundation offers a prize (grant) for which 
the groups compete. The competition is such that the one that invests more resources in helping 
migrants has a higher probability of winning and obtaining even more resources. We address 
how the foundation elicits the most effort from the different "grass roots" groups. 
Each group – that is, a part of immigrant society that possesses a common perspective 
and acts to achieve it – wants the authority and rewards for implementing its own plan, believing 
its proposal will best help its countrymen.  The groups may aim to achieve a certain degree of 
assimilation on the part of immigrants, though each group has its own strategy.  They may differ 
on the degree of cultural identity they want to maintain with their birthplace (see, for example, 
Alesina  and  La  Ferrara,  2000,  Anas,  2002,  Bisin  and  Verdier,  2000,  Dustmann,  Fabbri  and 
Preston, 2004, Gang and Zimmermann, 2000, Kahanec, 2006, and Lazear, 1999).  Each group 
seeks to lead immigrant society, and capturing the prize rewarded by the foundation.  The key to 
our analysis of who wins the contest is the contest rule structure. 
Studies of immigrants around the world show, with few exceptions, their earnings are 
substantially below those of comparable majority workers (Altonji and Blank 1999, Blau and 
Kahn, 1997, 2006, 2007, Smith and Welch, 1989, Bhaumik, Gang and Yun, 2006). Partly, this 
reflects a failure on the part of the immigrants to undertake the effort to assimilate with the local 
community (Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann, 2008). “Lack of effort” can arise from the 
desire to maintain a cultural heritage or separate identity which would be lost or reduced if the 
group assimilated.  The failure to take active steps to assimilate can also arise in the face of high  
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adjustment costs, such as inadequate language skills, intergenerational familial conflicts, and, in 
the case of immigrants, lack of knowledge about the host country labor market (Chiswick and 
Miller, 1995, 1996, Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2005). Yet for immigrants and their descendants, 
as length of time in the host country increases, assimilation generally  creeps in and various 
immigrant labor market indicators approach those of comparable majority workers. On occasion, 
they outperform the native-born (Chiswick, 1977, Deutsch, Epstein and Lecker, 2006). 
Efforts made to assimilate, and time, are two elements working to bring immigrants onto 
line with the native-born.  A third element, the degree to which the local society welcomes 
immigrants, also plays a role.  Often, the local society is less than welcoming, blaming migrants 
for depressing wages and displacing native-born workers – i.e., causing unemployment. This 
presumption has very strong policy implications and is implicit, for example, in the calls for 
increased regulation of immigration heard worldwide. Yet, there is mixed evidence on the impact 
of immigrants on the local’s wages and employment – it depends on whether they are substitutes 
or complements with respect to the skills and other attributes they bring to the labor market 
(Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994, Gang, Rivera-Batiz and Yun 2002 and this volume). Whether 
immigrants actually lower wages and increase employment, or not, the perception exists that 
they do so.  Because of this perception the local population may take active steps to discourage 
immigrants’ assimilation – discrimination, isolation, and so on.   For this reason effort in needed 
to decrease the barriers between the local population and the migrants. 
Epstein and Gang (2009a) are interested in why migrants are so often at a disadvantage 
relative to the native-born, the circumstances under which their status changes or stagnates over 
time,  and  role  public  policy  can  play.    Often  the  efforts  of  the  immigrants  and  the  local 
population are mediated through political institutions. These institutions exist in both worlds.  
They could be, for example, political parties, trade organizations, unions, or thugs.  These are 
organizations that are able to overcome the free-rider problem individual members of each group 
have in moving from the actions they desire to take, to actually taking the actions.  Yet, while an 
organization’s purpose may be to represent the members of their group, the interests’ of the 
organization and that of its members do not always coincide.  Assimilation efforts by migrants, 
harassment by the native-born and time are the three elements that determine how well migrants 
do.  Epstein and Gang (2009a) examine the consequences for these of increases in the numbers 
of immigrants, time, and the role of politics.  They construct a model in which there are four  
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actors:  the members of the majority and the organization that represents them, and members of 
the minority and the organization that represents them. Over time, the organization representing 
the migrants and immigrants themselves may exhibit different interests in assimilating and in 
maintaining their cultural identity.  They discuss how this affects the migrants’ position over 
time and discuss the public policy implications of the model. 
  In this paper, we describe and compare two mechanisms for rewarding groups for their 
efforts.  Absolute ranking is a contest between the groups where the winning one receives all the 
grants – those who put forth the most effort win.  In this situation the simultaneous bidders are 
the groups, and their bids are the actions/investments they undertake.  Those that take the most 
action, or those that are perceived to have taken the most action, win, and acquire all the grant. 
On the other hand, in relative ranking the groups compete against each other and obtain grant 
relative to the amount of effort invested in the contest.  This can be seen as a lottery contest in 
which each obtains grant proportional to the effort invested. In both cases, in equilibrium, the 
grant obtained is a function of the efforts invested. 
  The structure of the contest can be a key element determining the direction immigrant 
society  goes.  The  foundation  wishes  to  maximize  the  efforts  made  by  the  groups  to  help 
immigrant society.  We develop economic theory that considers how such competition affects the 
resources invested by each group and the performance of immigrant society.  We wish to see 
how  these  two  alternative  rewards  systems  –  absolute  and  relative  ranking  –  affect  the 
implementation  and  achievement  of  the  foundations’ goals.    For  us,  the  question  is in what 
situations  —  and  for  whom  —  is  an  absolute  ranking  of  groups  desirable,  and  in  what 
circumstances — and for whom — is such a ranking a detriment vis-à-vis a relative ranking 
scheme.
1 
  The  next  section  first  describes  the  model.    It  implements  the  relative  and  absolute 
decision  rules  in  the  context  of  the  model,  and  compares  the  implications  for  each  of  the 
concerned parties.  A concluding section follows. 
 
                                                 
1 This is an implementation of the paper on Aid allocation developed  by Epstein and Gang 
(2009b) into the type of questions asked and discussed in Epstein and Gang (2009a).  
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2.  The Model 
Consider  the  case  where  there  exist  m  groups  in  the  immigrant  society  that  have  partly 
overlapping  programs.    Each  group  has  the  same  objective  in  terms  of  helping  and  finding 
solutions to problems of their society. Each obtains a reward for helping their fellow immigrants.  
The reward is a grant (or grants) from the foundation. 
  The maximum reward group i (i=1,2) receives by helping its countrymen is ni, where ni 
can be greater or smaller than nj for all  i j ≠ , depending on which group has more to gain. In 
probabilistic terms, the probability that group i wins the contest and receives a grant of ni is equal 
to Pri .  The expected grant group i receives from this contest is Prini.  Alternatively, we can think 
of Pri as the proportion of the grant (or a proportion of the grants rewarded) this group receives 
in  the  competition.  We  talk  generally  about  proportions  of  the  grant  obtained  and  not 
probabilities of winning the contest, keeping in mind that the two are equivalent. 
  Groups  invest  effort  trying  to  help  immigrant  society.    Effort,  xi,  can  be  seen  as  a 
monetary value, time, effort, etc. and we assume that the cost of each unit of effort is one unit. 
Own effort, the efforts invested by the other group, the stakes and the contest success function; 
determine the probability of winning the contest.  
  Let w denote the net payoff received by a group. The expected net payoff (surplus) for 
the risk neutral group is given by  
(1)            ( ) m i x n w E i i i i ,..., 2 , 1 Pr = ∀ − = . 
   
We assume that the proportion of the grant obtained in the contest (or the probability of 
winning the contest) satisfies the following conditions:   






i . This means 
that  the  foundation  will  only  give  one  of  the  groups  the  grant.  An  alternative 
explanation would be that both groups get credit for what they did and as such obtain 
a proportion of the grant they could have won if there was only one group winning.   











(iii)  As group j, the opponent of group i, increases its effort, the proportion of the grant 









(iv)  The  marginal  increase  in  the  proportion  of  the  grant  obtained  from  the  contest 










  (this  inequality  ensures  that  the 
second order conditions for maximization are satisfied).
  
(v)  To simplify, we do not discuss the possibility of free riding for the different groups.  
One could think of a situation under which the actions of one group positively affect 
the proportion obtained by the other group, as the people do not always know which 















i   
 
The function Pri(.) is usually referred to as a contest success function (CSF). The functional 
forms of the CSF’s commonly assumed in the literature satisfy these assumptions (see Nitzan, 
1994). 
The groups engage in a contest and we assume a Nash equilibrium outcome. Each group 
determines  the  level  of  its  activities  xi  so  that  its  expected  payoff,  ( ) m i w E i ,.., 2 , 1 = ∀ ,  is 
maximized.  The first order condition for maximization is given by  


















Equation (2) is satisfied if and only if  
 










Thus, given that the proportion has decreasing marginal utility with respect to the level of effort 
invested, the group with the higher benefit from the contest will invest more effort in the contest.   
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For example, if group 1 has the higher benefit in the contest compared to group 2,  2 1 n n > , then 












order to increase its proportion of the grant.  The group that has a higher benefit from winning 
the contest will invest the highest amount of effort. 
To simplify and without loss of generality assume that:  
 
(4)        m n n n n ≥ ≥ > ≥ ... 3 2 1  
 
  This assumption simply states that there are two groups that have higher stakes than all 
the rest of the groups.   
  We now describe two highly stylized (extreme) regimes, (1) absolute ranking, and (2) 
relative ranking.  In the Absolute ranking we have one winning group even though both groups 
helped immigrant society. Here the winner of the contest obtains all the grant. On the other hand, 
in  Relative  ranking  the  two  groups  divide  the  grants  relative  to  their  achievements.  These 
situations do not simultaneously coexist.  However, comparing their outcomes provides useful 
insights, and we compare them after fully detailing each of the scenarios.  
 
The Absolute Ranking      
This ranking states that the group investing the largest amount of effort wins the grant. This type 
of contest is defined by using the all pay auction, and here thinking in terms of the probability of 
winning the contest enhances our intuition. In the absolute ranking the probability of winning is a 
function of the efforts invested by groups or the efforts perceived by the foundation. (Note that in 
equilibrium the efforts will be a function of the grants the groups can obtain). In the absolute 
ranking the probability of winning is 
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It can be verified that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium as well as a 
continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria. In any equilibrium, groups 3 through m invest zero 
effort in activities with probability one (see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries, 1996), so that only 
the two groups who make the greatest efforts will participate.  We conduct our analysis for two 
groups, groups 1 and 2.  Without loss of generality, assume that 2 1 n n > ; thus group 1 has greater 
gain from winning the contest.  It is clear, therefore, that group 1 is able to bid more than group 
2.  However, it is not clear how much each will bid in equilibrium.  
Based on these findings, we can obtain equilibrium expected expenditures, equilibrium 
probabilities and expected payoffs.   
Since the efforts of the two groups are random variables, it is clear that the probability 
that  j i x x = equals zero ( ) 0 ) ( = = j i x x P  (see Cohen and Sela (2007)).  Thus in the case of only 
two groups the probability of winning the grant becomes 
 

















   
The expected activity level for each group is (see appendix for calculations)  
 










x E = = . 
 
The equilibrium probability of winning the contest for each group equals 
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The expected equilibrium payoff for each group equals  
 




1 = − = w E and n n w E . 
 
In equilibrium, the total amount of activities carried out by the groups’ equals 
 















= + = . 
 
  Notice that if both groups can obtain the same benefit, n1=n2=n, the expenditure of each 




















1 = = w E w E ; and the total 
effort invested equals  n X =
* . 
 
The Relative ranking  
Here we consider the case when groups compete with one another in a contest in which there is 
no single winner.  Later we will compare the two extreme cases with one another: the Absolute 
ranking with the Relative ranking.   
Without a winner taking all the grant each group fights to obtain its maximum possible 
portion.  We  assume  that  the  contest  is  characterized  by  the  relative  ranking  (Lockard  and 
Tullock,  2001),  2 Pr ≤
+
= r for




i .    The  return  to  effort  in  this  lottery  function  is 
captured  by  the  parameter  r.    When  r  approaches  infinity  the  relative  ranking  becomes  the 
absolute ranking under which the group that invests in the highest level of activities wins the 
contest (see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries, 1993, 1996).  The idea behind this is that the group 
with the higher benefit has a weight of infinity and thus will win with probability one and the  
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group with the lower stake will lose with probability one. 
   For now we assume that r is known and fixed and  2 ≤ r .  The expected net payoff 
(surplus) for the risk neutral group is thus given by 
(11)  ( ) 2 , 1 = ∀ −
+
= i x n
r x r x
r x





The first order condition, as stated in equation (2), which ensures that the group maximizes its 
expected payoff, is given by 
(12)            ( )
j i j i n
r x r x





















Denote by  j i j i xi ≠ = ∀ 2 , 1 ,
*  the Nash equilibrium outcome of the contest. Solving (12) for 
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. In a similar 
way we calculate the optimal level of x2.  
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We  can  also  think  of  this  terms  of  the  proportion  of  the  grants  obtained  from  the  contest. 
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium proportion of the grants obtained in the contest equals 









i ≠ = ∀
+




The expected equilibrium payoff for each group equals 
 
(15)    ( )
( )
. 2 , , 2 , 1 ,
2
1 1 1 2
2
1














r j i j i n w E
r n r n
r
j n r n r r n
r n r n
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i    
 
And finally, we can calculate the total amount of effort invested in the contest by the two groups.  
In the literature this measure is called grant dissipation and usually has a negative connotation, 
i.e. the contest designer tries to decrease the grant dissipation. Here grant dissipation can be seen 
in a positive light as it helps the country needing help. We denote this total effort in equilibrium 
by 
* X : 
 
(16)       ( )
( )
j i j i
n n











j i ≠ = ∀
+
+
= + = 2 , 1 , 2
* * *  . 
In the case where the  groups are symmetric, i.e., n1=n2=n, we would obtain the following: the 
level of activities of each group equals  j i j i
r
n xi ≠ = ∀ = 2 , 1 ,
4
*  (remember that r is less 





x = ); 




* = i ;  the  expected  equilibrium  payoff  to  each  group  equals  ( )
4
2 n r −
  (once  again,  
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remember that r is less than or equal to 2),
3 and finally the total effort in equilibrium equals 
2
* n r
X = .   
Let  us  consider  how  changes  in  r  affect  the  expected  equilibrium  payoff, 
( )
( )
, 2 , , 2 , 1 ,
2
1 1 1 2
2
1
















= r j i j i
r n r n
r
j n r n r r n
r n r n
r
j n r n r
n










i   and  how 
total effort is affected in equilibrium,  ( )
( )
j i j i
n n











j i ≠ = ∀
+
+
= + = 2 , 1 , 2
* * * .  To 
simplify our calculations denote by a the relative benefit of the second group receiving the grant 





a = .  Given a we recalculate the 
expected payoff and total effort in equilibrium as          
( )
( ) ( )
( )


























a a n r
X and
r a






i ,  
where,    ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1



























































  As we can see from the above, the effect 
of a change in the parameter r has an ambiguous affect on the expected payoff and expenditure 
of the groups.  For example, without loss of generality assume that a < 1.  Since Ln(a) < 0 then 































                                                 
3  For r > 2 the equilibrium differs from this one as it is based on mixed and not pure strategies.  
This is the case in the all pay auction that we previously described.    
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Comparing the investment of effort of the groups under Both Situations 
The groups do not have a choice between the Absolute ranking and Relative ranking contests we 
model above.  They face what they face.  Over time what they face may change, and we are 
interested in the outcomes of each of the situations. We now compare these two types of contests 
from  the  perspectives  of  the  groups,  immigrant  society,  and  the  foundation.    X
*  gives  the 
aggregate activity of the groups in equilibrium (for the case of stakes that do not depend on the 
efforts invested by the contestants, see Epstein and Nitzan, 2006a, 2006b, 2007). 
  Under the relative ranking,  2 Pr ≤
+
= r for




i , from (16) we obtain that the total 
amount of activities carried out is equal to  ( )
( )
j i j i
n n











j i L ≠ = ∀
+
+
= + = 2 , 1 , 2
* * * . 
In order to simplify our analysis let us assume that r = 1 (remember that the values that r can 
take on in this case are between two and zero).  Under the absolute ranking, from equation (10) 
we obtain that the total investment into activities is equal to ( ) ( )
1





= .    
  The  total  amount  of  expenditure  invested  in  the  contest  is  higher  under  the  relative 
ranking than under the absolute ranking regime if  
 

















Equation (17) holds if and only if  
 
(18)        0 2 2 2 1
2
1 > − − n n n n . 
 
From (18) we may conclude that the total amount of expenditure invested in the contest by the 
different  groups  is  higher  under  the  relative  ranking  rather  than  under  the  absolute  ranking 
regime if    
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(19)        ( ) 2 1 2 1 + > n n . 
 
Since, by assumption,  2 1 n n ≥ , the result tells us that in order for the lottery contest to be worse 
for the receiving, the grant that one of the groups can obtain from such actions must be larger 
than  the  other  group’s  grant  (more  than  twice  as  large).    We  summarize  this  result  in  the 
following proposition: 
 
If the variance of grants that can be generated by helping immigrant society is sufficiently large, 





, then the foundation--  which is interested in maximizing the total effort of the 
groups -- prefers that the absolute ranking contest where the group that invests the most effort 
wins. If each group has the same stake, i.e., n1=n2, then the foundation prefers the relative 
ranking.  
 
    In order to analyze the preferences of the groups we must compare their expected payoffs 
under both the relative ranking and the absolute ranking regime.  Remember that we assumed, 
without loss of generality, that group 1 has at least as large a stake as the second group( ) 2 1 n n ≥ .  
The groups prefer the regime that generates for them the maximum expected equilibrium payoff, 
( )
*
i w E .  Under the relative ranking, and again assuming r = 1, the expected equilibrium payoff 














w E while the expected equilibrium 
under the absolute ranking equals zero,  ( ) 0
*
2 = w E .  Therefore it is clear that,  
 
The weaker group, the group that has less to gain from helping its countrymen, always prefers 
the relative ranking system.   
 
















w EL while  the  expected  equilibrium  under  the  absolute  ranking  equals 
( ) 2 1
*
1 n n w EP − = .   The expected payoff for group 1 under the relative ranking regime is greater 
than that obtained under the absolute ranking regime and thus this group prefers the relative 
ranking regime if  
 
(20)         
 
Equation (20) holds if and only if 
 
(21)        0 2 2 2 1
2
1 < − − n n n n . 
 
From equation (21) we may conclude that the expected payoff in the contest and efforts made are 
higher under the relative ranking rather than under the absolute ranking regime if    
 
(22)      ( ) 2 1 0 2 1 + < < n n . 
 
In other words, 
 
The  group with the higher stake, with more to gain from helping their countrymen, prefers the 
relative ranking to an absolute ranking if the difference between the groups is not sufficiently 





.   
  
Note that the interests of foundation and the strongest group always align.   
 







w E n n
n n
n









In our society there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help migrants. In 
order to help migrants the foundation needs grass roots organizations to invest their efforts in 
helping migrants (for example in the USA the McArthur Foundation and the Ford Foundation 
that want to help immigrants.)  The foundation announces a prize (grant) for which the groups 
compete. The competition is such that the one that invests more resources in helping the migrants 
has a higher probability of winning and obtaining more resources. The question is, how the 
foundation elicits the most effort from the different "grass roots" groups. 
               In  a  highly  structured  and  simple  model  we  characterize  and  compare  two  ex  ante 
regimes:  (1) the absolute reward scheme presented by an all-pay auction in which the winner 
takes all available grants; (2) the relative reward scheme in which the grant allocation rule is a 
lottery and each group obtains a proportion of the grants. In the former regime the equilibrium is 
in  mixed  strategies,  the  "stronger"  group  could  actually  lose  the  contest  and  get  nothing.  
However, the expected payoff for the weaker group is zero. 
  The contests we address are the fractious relationships among groups seeking to increase 
their expected payoff. We are able to derive a very specific condition allowing us to see when 
each of the concerned parties wins and when each loses their contests. If the difference between 
the groups in terms of the rewards they can obtain from helping the country is not sufficiently 
large, all parties – the two groups and the foundation itself – prefer the lottery regime relative 
ranking to an absolute ranking.  However, if the difference between the groups in terms of the 
rewards that can be obtained is sufficiently large, then the group with the low benefit, group 2, 
prefers the relative ranking regime while the other group and the foundation prefer the absolute 
ranking.  
  The contests we address are the fractious relationships among groups seeking help their 
immigrant society.  Aside from the insights we are able to provide about the reward ranking 
scheme, our work is further distinguished by accounting for:  (i) the possibility of recipient 
activities that can change the groups’ ordering of the regimes, and (ii) recipients gain based on 
reward regime.  
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Appendix 
It is a standard result that there are no pure strategy equilibria in all-pay auctions (Hillman and 
Riley (1989), Ellingsen (1991) and Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1993, 1996)). Suppose group 
2 bids 0 < x2  ≤ n2 . Then the first group’s optimal response is x1  = x2 + ε < n1   (i.e., 
marginally higher than x2). But then x2 > 0 cannot be an optimal response to x1 = x2 + ε. Also, it 
is obvious that x1 = x2 = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, there is no equilibrium in pure 
strategies. There is a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies given by the following cumulative 
distribution functions (see Hillman and Riley (1989), Ellingsen (1991) and Baye, Kovenock, and 
de  Vries,  1996)):    ( ) ) , 0 [ 2 1
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1
1 1 n x for
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x G ∈ + − = .    The 
equilibrium c.d.f’s show that group 1 bids uniformly on [0, n2], while group 2 puts a probability 
mass  equal  to  (1–n2/n1)  on  x2=0.    The  expected  investment  expenditures  are 





2 2 2 2
2
0




x dG x x E and
n
x dG x x E
n n
= = = = ∫ ∫ .  Note, we think of the all-pay auction 
as probabilistic - i.e., the stronger group is more likely to win the contest. 
 